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IQBAL, TWOMBLY, AND THE LESSONS OF THE
CELOTEX TRILOGY
by
Hillel Y Levin
This Essay compares the Twombly/Iqbal line of cases to the Celotex
trilogy and suggests that developments since the latter offer lessons for the
former. Some of the comparisons are obvious: decreased access and
increased judicial discretion. However, one important similarity has not
been well understood: namely that the driving force in both contexts has
been the lower courts rather than the Supreme Court. Further, while we
can expect additional access barriers to be erected in the future, our focus
should be on lower courts, rather than other institutional players, as the
likely source of those barriers.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's recent rulings in Ashcroft v. Iqbat and Bell
Atlantic v. Twombly2 fundamentally alter the Court's approach to the
standards governing pleading. Iqbal confirmed and magnified what many
suspected Twombly represented: a dramatic and radical shift from a
liberal notice pleading standard to a heightened, but nebulous,
plausibility standard. But this was hardly an unprecedented shift.
. Hillel Y. Levin is an Assistant Professor at the University of Georgia School of
Law. He thanks Tom Eaton, Bo Rutledge, Harlan Cohen, and Howard Wasserman for
their time and advice. All errors are theirs.
' 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
2 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007).
" Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957); Leatherman v. Tarrant County
Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993); Swierkiewicz v.
Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 (2002).
4 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-54. The plausibility standard first appeared in Twombly,
127 S. Ct. at 1965-71. Scholars immediately began to debate whether, how, and in
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Indeed, the more one looks at these opinions, the more one finds
striking parallels to the Court's similar shift in the summary judgment
context less than three decades ago. I speak, of course, of the famous
(infamous?) Celotex trilogy.5 This Essay explores these parallels and
suggests that our history with summary judgment offers some critical
lessons for our future with pleading.
This Essay assumes familiarity with the Iqbal and Twombly cases and
proceeds as follows: Part 11 identifies three parallels between the Court's
apparent shift in the pleadings context and its earlier shift in that of
summary judgment. The first two of these parallels relate to their access-
limiting features and the consequent empowering of the judge. I suspect
that most participants in this symposium will not object to my drawing
these parallels. Indeed, some of these are fast becoming accepted as fact
among civil procedure aficionados.'
The third parallel, however, is likely to be simultaneously the most
controversial and the most important because of its broader implications
and the lessons it suggests. Specifically, I argue that, contrary to what I
perceive to be the emerging conventional wisdom, neither the
imposition of heightened pleading standards nor the Court's blessing of
summary judgment in the Celotex trilogy represented, in the main,
innovations on the part of the Supreme Court. In fact, these doctrinal
developments are not primarily the work of the Supreme Court at all, but
rather of the lower courts. Far from representing a sudden change in
course for the federal courts, they are best viewed as lag indicators (albeit
imperfect ones) of what had been going on in the lower courts for years.
Although this final claim may be controversial, the truth is that it fits
comfortably with the first two observations. It is the lower courts, and not
the Supreme Court, that are invested in docket control mechanisms and
that stand to benefit from decreasing access and enhancing the role of
what circumstances it altered pleading doctrine. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Bell
Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions to Dismiss Become (Disguised) Summaiy judgments, 25
WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 61 (2007); Scott Dodson, Pleading Standards After Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 93 VA. L. REv. IN BRIEF 135 (2007); Michael C. Doff, The Supreme
Court Wreaks Havoc in the Lower Federal Courts-Again, FiNDL-Aw's WRIT, Aug. 13, 2007,
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20070813.html; Keith Bradley, Pleading Standards
Should Not Change After Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 117
(2007). The majority of the scholarship argued that Twombly had far-reaching
consequences.
'Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242 (1986); and Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574(1986).
6 Yes, we exist, and we are a fun lot. My claims about the conventional wisdom
comes from my reading of, and participation in, conversations about the cases
privately and through internet discussions on a civil procedure professors' listserv. In
addition, Jon Siegel, Howard Wasserman, and others have discussed the case
extensively on legal blogs like PrawfsBlawg, http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com-
prawfsblawg, Concurring Opinions, http://www.concurringopinions.com, and
elsewhere. Finally, these views have been broadly reflected in the emerging law review
literature on these cases.
144 Vol. 14:1
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the judge. It thus makes sense-even if we generally do not think of it
this way-that the lower courts, rather than the Supreme Court, are the
force behind these innovations.
Part III concludes by offering several lessons from the summary
judgment context for the future of pleading and civil procedure
jurisprudence more generally. Most importantly, I suggest that we are
likely to see the trends that the Twombly/Iqbal line and the Celotex trilogy
represent continue, and that the best way to identify the next move is to
look at the lower courts rather than the Supreme Court.
II. THE PARALLELS BETWEEN TWOMBLY/IQBAL
AND THE (JELOTEX TRILOGY
Consider the following brief narrative. For a fairly long time, the
Supreme Court was not particularly receptive to arguments that trial
courts should use a particular tool for managing their dockets except in
the most extreme cases. Then, suddenly, the Court did something of an
about-face and embraced this tool. As a result, plaintiffs will find it more
difficult to pursue their cases.7
I am describing, of course, the Twombly/Iqbal line of cases; but I
could just as easily be describing the Celotex trilogy, in which the Supreme
Court apparently put aside its previous misgivings about the use of
summary judgment as a tool for managing dockets. Indeed, reading
these more recent cases, one cannot help but feel a sense of d~jA vu. In
this Part, I will expand on this general observation and identify some
stark parallels between the two sets of cases. As I indicated in the
introduction, some of these embrace the emerging scholarly consensus;
but the most important parallel, which relates to how we in the legal
academy think about and talk about the Supreme Court's role,
represents something of a challenge to what I take to be the conventional
wisdom.
A. Access, Access, Access-and Beyond
The first and most obvious similarity between the imposition of
heightened pleading standards and the earlier embrace of summary
judgment as a docket management tool is that the likely effect of both is
to reduce access by plaintiffs to trials and juries.8 The granting of
See infra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Posting of Jon Siegel to Concurring Opinions, Iqbal Keeps Spreading,
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2009/09/iqbal-keeps-spreading.html
(Sept. 8, 2009, 12:40 PM); Posting oflon Siegel to LAW PROF on the LOOSE, Iqbal's
Children, http://jsiegel.blogspot.com/2009/08/iqbals-children.html (Aug. 4, 2009,
1:06 PM) [hereinafter Iqbal's Children]; Posting of Jon Siegel to LAW PROF on the
LOOSE, Icky Iqbal, http://jsiegel.blogspot.com/2009/05/icky-iqbal.html (May 19,
2009, 7:00 AM); Posting of Scott Dodson to Civil Procedure & Federal Courts Blog,
Beyond Twombly, http://Iawprofessors.typepad.com/civpro/2009/05/beyond-
twombly-by-prof-scott-dodson.html (May 18, 2009); Michael C. Dorf, The Supreme Court
20101 145
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summary judgment, in the most basic terms, is the judge saying, "The
story that you tell is not supported by enough evidence, so you are not
entitled to a jury trial." The plausibility standard is similar. Here, the
judge effectively says, "Your story is so implausible that not only are you
not entitled to ajury trial, you are not entitled to proceed." To be sure,
the two are not the same; the new pleading standard goes so far as to
prevent plaintiffs in these cases from ever even having the opportunity to
conduct discovery in order to generate evidence.9 But they are similar in
that they are both ways of getting rid of cases that seem (at least to
someone) to be meritless.'o
Beyond simply limiting access by plaintiffs to courts and juries,
enhanced roles of motions to dismiss and motions for summary
judgment may have profound effects throughout the case management
process. They potentially diminish the role of the jury," raise the costs of
litigation for plaintiffs (and possibly defendants as well), drive down
settlement costs," and change the kinds of cases that are brought in the
first place. 4
In these respects, both the Twombly/Iqbal line and the Celotex trilogy
are part of a much larger trend towards limiting access throughout the
federal trial system. Other examples of this trend include 'jurisdiction-
stripping;"'5 the push and rush to settle;" sealed settlement agreements;
Dismisses a 9/11 Detainee's Civil Lawsuit, FINDLAw's WRIT, May 20, 2009, http://writ.
news.findlaw.com/dorf/20090520.html; Posting of Howard Wasserman to
PrawfsBlawg, Iqbal and the Death of Notice Pleading: Part I, http://prawfsblawg.blogs.
com/prawfsblawg/2009/05/iqbal-and-the-death-of-notice-pleading-part-i.html (May
18, 2009, 4:48 PM); Posting of Howard Wasserman to PrawfsBlawg, Iqbal and the Death
of Notice Pleading: Part II, http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2009/05/
iqbal-and-the-death-of-notice-pleading-part-ii.html (May 18, 2009, 6:12 PM).
'Iqbal's Children, supra note 8; Posting of Jon Siegel to Concurring Opinions,
Iqbal Empirics, http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2009/09/iqbal-em
pirics.html (Sept. 9, 2009, 6:50 AM) [hereinafter Siegel, Iqbal Empirics].
" See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to judgment: Are the "Litigation
Explosion," "Liability Crisis, " and Efficiency Clichis Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial
Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 1016 (2003).
" Obviously, if more cases are dismissed earlier, potentially fewer cases can make
it to ajury.
Heightened pleading standards potentially introduce costs. See discussion infra
Part III. See also Siegel, Iqbal Empirics, supra note 9.
A greater likelihood of dismissal might lead to lower settlements.
1 Attorneys may decline to bring claims that may not survive motions to dismiss.
See, e.g., Giovanna Shay & Johanna Kalb, More Stories ofJurisdiction-Stripping and
Executive Power: Interpreting the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 29 CARDoZO L. REV.
291, 293 (2007).
" See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984) ("I do
not believe that settlement as a generic practice is preferable to judgment or should
be institutionalized on a wholesale and indiscriminate basis. It should be treated
instead as a highly problematic technique for streamlining dockets."); David Luban,
Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619 (1995).
" See, e.g., Laurie Kratky Dor6, Settlement, Secrecy, and judicial Discretion: South
Carolina's New Rules Governing the Sealing of Settlements, 55 S.C. L. REv. 791, 804 (2004);
146 [Vol. 14:1
HeinOnline  -- 14 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 146 2010
2010] LESSONS OF THE CELOTEX TRILOGY 147
unpublished, unexplained, inaccessible, and non-precedential judicial
opinions;" the resort to para-judicial personnel for case management;1
and sealed files and secret dockets.20 No doubt there are more, but the
point is that the common perception of our judicial system as open and
accessible-a place for people to go to actually have their disputes
adjudicated on their merits-is something of a farce. Rather, it is best
Andrew D. Goldstein, Sealing and Revealing: Rethinking the Rules Governing Public Access
to Inormation Generated Through Litigation, 81 CHI.-KENTr. L. Rrv. 375, 377-378 (2006).
8See, e.g., Hillel Y. Levin, Making the Law: Unpublication in the District Courts, 53
VILL. L. REv. 973 (2008); Jessie Allen, just Words? The Effects of No-Citation Rules in
Federal Courts of Appeals, 29 VT. L. REv. 555 (2005); Keith H. Beyler, Selective Publication
Rules: An Empirical Study, 21 Loy'. U. CHI. L.J. 1 (1989); Susan W. Brenner, Of
Publication and Precedent: An Inquiry into the Ethnomethodology of Case Reporting in the
American Legal System, 39 DEPAuL L. REv%. 461 (1990); Richard B. Cappalli, T he Common
Law's Case Against Non-Precedential Opinions, 76 S. CAL. L. REv. 755 (2003); Charles E.
Carpenter, Jr., The No-Citation Rule for Unpublished Opinions: Do the Ends of Expediency for
Overloaded Appellate Courts justify the Means of Secrecy?, 50 S.C. L. REv. 235, 249-50
(1998); Lawrence J. Fox, Those Unpublished Opinions: An Appropriate Expedience or an
Abdication of Responsibility?, 32 HOFsTRA L. Rrv. 1215 (2004); Mark D. Hinderks & Steve
A. Leben, Restoring the Common in the Law: A Proposal for the Elimination of Rules
Prohibiting the Citation of Unpublished Decisions in Kansas and the Tenth Circuit, 31
WASHBuRN L.J. 155 (1992); Elizabeth M. Horton, Comment, Selective Publication and
the Authority of Precedent in the United States Courts of Appeals, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1691
(1995); Deborah Jones Merritt & James J. Brudney, Stalking Secret Law: What Predicts
Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals, 54 VAND. L. REv. 71 (2001); William R.
Mills, The Shape of the Universe: The Impact of Unpublished Opinions on the Process of Legal
Research, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 429 (2003); Martha Dragich Pearson, Citation of
Unpublished Opinions as Precedent, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1235 (2004); Penelope Pether,
Sorcerers, Not Apprentices: How judicial Clerks and Staff Attorneys Impoverish US. Law, 39
ARiz. ST. L.J. 1 (2007) [hereinafter Pether, Clerks and Staff; William L. Reynolds &
William M. Rich man, An Evaluation of Limited Publication in the United States Courts Of
Appeals: The Price of Reform, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 573 (1981); William L. Reynolds &
William M. Richman, The Non-Precedential Precedent-Limited Publication and No-Citation
Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1167 (1978); Lauren K.
Robel, The Myth of the Disposable Opinion: Unpublished Opinions and Government Litigants
in the United States Courts of Appeals, 87 MICH. L. REv. 940 (1989); Michael B.W.
Sinclair, Anastasoff Versns Hart: The Constitutionality and Wisdom of Denying Precedential
Authority to Circuit Court Decisions, 64 U. PITr. L. REv. 695 (2003), Arthur B. Spiter &
Charles H. Wilson, Trial Balloon: The Mischief of the Unpublished Opinion, LITIG.,
Summer 1995; Stephen L. Wasby, Unpublished Court of Appeals Decisions: A Hard Look at
the Process, 14 S. CAL. INTERDISc. L.J. 67 (2004). In addition to this list, which is by no
means complete, the Washington and Lee Law Review hosted an excellent symposium
on the issue, published at Symposium, Have We Ceased to be a Common Law Country? A
Conversation on Unpublished, Depublished, Withdrawn and Per Curiam Opinions, 62 WASH.
& LEE L. RE\,. 1429 (2005) [hereinafter Symposium]; Penelope Pether, Take a Letter,
Your Honor: Outing the Judicial Epistemologt of Hart v. Massanari, 62 WASH. & LEE L. Rrv.
1553 (2005).
'~See Pether, Clerks and Staff supra note 18.
2See United States v. Ochoa-Vasquez, 428 F.3d 1015, 1024-31 (11th Cir. 2005).
See also Joseph F. Anderson Jr., Hidden from the Public by Order of the Court: The Case
Against Government-Enforced Secrecy, 55 S.C. L. REv. 711, 714-15 (2004); David S.
Sanson, The Pervasive Problem of Court-Sanctioned Secrecy and the Exigency of National
Reform, 53 DuKE L.J. 807 (2003).
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understood as a bureaucratic system for disposing of disputes. And now,
as with the Celotex trilogy and summary judgment, the Supreme Court has
blessed another means of dispute disposal.
B. Empowering the Judge
A closely-related and perhaps similarly obvious parallel between the
Twombly/Iqbal line of cases and the Celotex trilogy is that they explicitly
enhance the judge's role as gatekeeper. More to the point, they each call
on the judge to use his or her own experiences and intuitions as
barometers for whether a case should proceed or be ejected.
In the summary judgment context, the doctrinal test for whether to
grant or deny summary judgment is whether, in light of all of the
evidence, "a reasonable jury" could believe what the party opposing
summary judgment claims. Who decides what a "reasonable jury" could
believe, and thus whether the party is entitled to a jury? The judge, of
course. But can anyone seriously disagree with the proposition that
different judges have different views of what a reasonable jury might
believe? Every time a court of appeals divides on what might be
reasonable is evidence that different views exist, as is every instance in
which an appellate court reverses a lower court on this question. Further,
we also have evidence that in some cases, factors like ajudge's gender will
influence whether he or she finds an interpretation of the facts to be
reasonable . Thus, the judge's personal experiences and intuitions,
which inevitably differ from judge to judge, shape the kinds of cases that
ajury gets to see.
In the pleadings context the story is even worse. justice Kennedy's
explanation of the role of the judge in Iqbal is, depending on your view of
this sort of thing, refreshingly candid or stunningly lawless (or perhaps
both). Confronting the obvious critique of the vagueness and ambiguity
of the plausibility standard introduced in Twombly, Kennedy writes that
"[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim... [is]
context-specific[,] ... requiriling] the reviewing court to draw on its ...
experience and common sense. 22 This can only be read as an explicit
invitation for the judge to use his or her own experience and intuitions as
a baseline for whether a complaint can proceed.
I am certainly not the first to compare these aspects of the Celotex
trilogy and the Twombly/Iqbal line. Suja Thomas has already written
extensively on this topic in arguing that modem sumnmaryjudgment and
"1 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986).
22Deborah Rhode, In a "Different" Voice: What Does the Res~earch About How Gender~
Influences judging Actually Say?, SLATE, June 10, 2009, http://www.slate.com/
id/2220220 (citing and discussing empirical studies).
23Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009).
148 Vol. 14:1
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the new pleading standards are both unconstitutional for precisely this
reason. 24And so, again, I shall move on.
C. It Came From Below
Now we arrive at what I expect will be the least intuitive and most
controversial link between the Celotex trilogy and the recent cases on
pleading: the most interesting story here lies not with the Supreme
Court, but with the lower courts.
To the extent we wish to identify bad actors in these cases, it is
tempting, easy, and convenient to point the finger at the Supreme Court
justices. And indeed, this is what we have seen among those who have
opposed the increased prominence of summary judgment; 2 5 and we are
26
already beginning to see it in the present context. The opinions
themselves and the justices who wrote them have become the focus of
the critique. But this is a mistake, at least in part.
The idea that the Supreme Court divined heightened pleading
standards and an increased role for summary judgment out of thin air, or
that these cases are primarily about the Supreme Court, are myths that
require puncturing. The real culprits here, and the proper focus of our
attention, are the many trial and appellate courts that changed practices
on the ground and finally pushed the Supreme Court to sign on to these
shifts in practice." At most, the Supreme Court has been a lag indicator
for what was already happening in the lower courts.
Consider first the summary judgment context. The story that
emerges from the literature is that, once upon a time, summary
judgment was a seldom-used device with little significance. But along
came the Supreme Court's Celotex trilogy, and all of that changed.
Suddenly, the use of summary judgment by litigants and judges
exploded, radically altering the federal system of civil adjudication.8
24 Suja A. Thomas, Why the Motion to Dismiss Is Now Unconstitutional, 92 MINN. L.
REv. 1851 (2008) [hereinafter Thomas, Motion to Dismiss]; Suja A. Thomas, Mhy
Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139 (2007).
25 See, eg., Patricia M. Wald, Summary judgment at Sixty, 76 TEX. L. Rrv. 1897,
1913-17 (1998) (summarizing the views of critics of the Celotex trilogy).
26 See Thomas, Motion to Dismiss, supra note 24, at 1853.
27 See Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary judgment in Federal Civil
Cases: Drifting Towards Bethlehem or Gomorrah?~, I1J. EmpiRICAL LEGAL STUD. 591 (2004);
Joe S. Cecil et al., A Quarter Century of Summary judgment Practice in Six Federal District
Courts, 4J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 861 (2007).
2" See, e.g., Wald, supra note 25, at 1914-15, 1917 (1998) ("Simply stated, to these
critics the 1986 cases appeared to have sharply tilted the playing field, forcing the
more disadvantaged parties to run uphill. These critics also worried that this trio of
decisions invaded the province of the factfinder by blocking trials even when material
facts were contested, on the basis of judges' predictions as to whether sustainable
inferences could be drawn from the few pieces of evidence that were available at this
early stage. What almost everyone in the academic and legal communities agreed on
was that the Supreme Court had moved summary judgment out of left field and onto
first base, where it began shortening the innings by taking out runners before they
20101 149
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But this story is false. The Supreme Court did not introduce the idea
that cases could be "managed" out of the courts through the use of
summary judgment in 1986. Rather, as recent empirical analysis has
persuasively established, the 2increased prominence of summary
judgment began in the 1970s. Lower courts used it expansively to
dismiss apparently meritless cases for quite a long time before the Court
jumped on the bandwagon and explicitly adopted the lower courts'
jurisprudence on the appropriate use of summaryjudgment.3
Now consider the current discourse over pleading standards. Once
again, we-the scholarly community-are discussing this issue because
the Supreme Court has suddenly, it seems, announced a doctrinal shift.
(It is, of course, the Supreme Court's decision in Iqbal that brings these
articles together.) The Court itself has become the story. Once again,
though, I believe that this emerging consensus is mistaken.
Several years ago, well before Twombly, Christopher M. Fairman
published The Myth of Notice Pleadin, a comprehensive analysis of
pleading standards in the lower courts. In it, Fairman showed that, per
the title of the article and notwithstanding the Court's stated
commitment to notice pleading, the trial and appellate courts had
32instituted higher pleading requirements in a stunning array of cases. In
a sense, they were ignoring the Supreme Court's explicit directives.
Further, one can see that the push towards higher pleading
standards comes from the lower courts from the fact that, up until
Twombly, the Supreme Court had to repeatedly reassert the notice
pleading standard and reject lower court efforts to assert higher
standards. For example, in 1993, long after the Court had adopted notice
pleading as the operative standard, the Court rejected the Fifth Circuit's
heightened pleading standard for civil rights cases alleging municipal
liability. 3 3 The Court stated that "it is impossible to square the
'heightened pleading standard' applied by the Fifth Circuit in this case
with the liberal system of 'notice pleading' set up by the Federal Rules. 3 4
Yet, in 2002, the Court had to once again reaffirm its black-letter doctrine
because other lower courts-here the courts in the Second Circuit-had
imposed heightened pleading standards in discrimination cases.3 And
then 2006 brought Twombly, in which, once again, the lower courts had
could even begin to make the rounds. From 1986 to the present day, summary
judgment has remained at first base and, some would say, it is getting progressively
better at tagging runners out.") (citations omitted).
2'Burbank, supra note 27, at 620. See also Cecil et at., supra note 27, at 861, 896.
'0 Cecil et al., supra note 27, at 861, 863, 902.
"Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARiz. L. REv. 987
(2003).
1Id. at 998-1059.
"Leatherman v. Tanrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit,
507 U.S. 163 (1993).
'Id. at 168.
1Swierkiewicz v. Soremia N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 (2002).
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moved towards higher pleading standards.~ The only difference between
Twombly and the earlier cases is that, for once, the Supreme Court
blinked.
I should be clear that I am not arguing that every lower court judge
favors or pushed for heightened pleading standards. It is worth noting,
for example, that the lower courts in Iqbal did not dismiss the case on
37grounds of insufficient pleadings. Further, I am not even claiming that a
majority of lower court judges prefer heightened pleading to notice
pleading standards. This is a difficult empirical question that I am not
particularly concerned with. Indeed, it seems to me that the debate over
pleading standards is at least partly ideological and political. But I do
think it is clear that the Supreme Court was pushed by at least some lower
court judges to adopt heightened pleading standards. Or, to put it
another way, in the absence of efforts on the part of lower courtjudges to
erect barriers to entry through the use of heightened pleading
requirements, the Supreme Court would not likely have done so on its
own.
That said, it is difficult to identify with any certainty what caused the
Supreme Court to blink in Twombly and Iqbal (and, earlier, in the
summary judgment context). My speculation is that it was due to some
combination of the following factors: Supreme Court justices' greater
identification and association with lower court judges than with plaintiffs;
lower courts' consistent articulation of the problems with docket
management and frivolous litigation; and a political and socio-legal
culture that increasingly views plain tiff-driven civil litigation with mistrust.
Whatever the specific mechanism, what we observe in these cases is a
dialectical process in which the lower courts alter the doctrine over time,
only to be rebuffed occasionally by the Supreme Court-until the Court
finally adopts the higher standards. This, much more complicated
version, is the story of the changes to pleading doctrine that we should
take to heart.
In addition to being a more complex story, this is also a much more
interesting one from a theoretical standpoint. How are we to understand
the relationship between the Supreme Court and the lower courts in
light of the ongoing fight over pleading standards between them, a fight
that the lower courts ultimately won? What did we mean when we said
that we had a notice pleading system if cases were routinely dismissed by
lower courts under higher standards of their own making? Or, more
broadly, what is the law? Is it what the putative lawmaker says, or what
those charged with applying it do?-m
SBell Adi. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007).
1See Iqhal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2007).
" I have explored this and related questions at length elsewhere. My own view is
similar to Llewellyn's: the law is what those applying it do. See Levin, supra note 18, at
979 (citing KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 12 (1951)).
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Most provocatively of all, the process by which lower courts push and
move the Supreme Court suggests that our general view of the
relationship between the Supreme Court and lower courts may be
backwards. It is not necessarily, as we tend to assume, that if we read
Supreme Court opinions we can deduce what lower courts will do (under
the assumption that they follow precedent); rather, it is that we can read
lower court opinions and deduce where the Supreme Court may end up.
It is easy to see why the lower courts have led the way in both the
sumnmaryjudgment and pleadings contexts. After all, the Supreme Court
gets to choose its own docket; the lower courts are stuck with whatever
cases people choose to bring. As a result, lower court judges are
preoccupied with managing their caseloads, and they have driven many
of the access-limiting innovations that I have identified.
None of this takes the Supreme Court off the hook, of course. Nor
does it suggest that Twombly and Iqbal will have no real impact on
litigation. It does not take the Supreme Court off the hook because to
the extent we consider these cases to be bad, at least the lower courts
have an excuse in the sense that they face docket pressures that the
Supreme Court does not. We can understand, even if we do not approve
of, their instinct to manage their dockets in this way. The Supreme
Court, though, acted without this excuse. Indeed, because of its ability to
control its docket and its distance from the pressures of docket
management, the Court is institutionally well positioned to reject and
resist these pressures. That it did not do so is surely an indictment of the
Court.
The Court also deserves criticism for another reason. Although the
lower courts' efforts to institute heightened pleading standards were
misguided and even lawless, at least the standards that they articulated
were often transparent. For example, in Swierkiewicz, the lower courts
applied their requirement that pleadings in an employment
discrimination case be sufficient to state a prima facie case under the
well-known McDonnell Douglas standard." A potential plaintiff or
plaintiffs' attorney confronted with this rule could at least know what was
expected of him or her. In contrast, the Supreme Court's plausibility
standard is extraordinarily vague, making it difficult for a party to judge
whether a potential lawsuit is worth bringing.
As for how the cases will have an impact below, I think the jury is still
out. To the extent that, as I have argued, these cases reflect the lower
courts' jurisprudence rather than remake it, one might conclude that
they are mostly irrelevant. But I believe that conclusion is too trite, and
there are at least two ways in which these cases matter. One way in which
they will surely have an impact is that they will generate a great deal of
litigation over what "plausible" means.
SSwierkiewicz v. Sorerna N.A., 5 Fed. App'x 63, 64 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)).
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Second, consider what the Court's alternative was in Twombly. It
could have once again reaffirmed its commitment to notice pleading.
This could have had the effect of making the lower courts more cautious,
at least temporarily, of dismissing cases for not meeting pleading
burdens. But the Court did not do that at all. Instead, it finally gave its
stamp of approval for the lower courts' fairly consistent efforts to raise
the standards. As a result, the lower courts' decisions and rhetoric may
shift in perceptible and imperceptible ways, as may litigant (and potential
litigant) behavior. For these reasons, I do not mean to suggest that these
cases are beside the point, but rather to caution that they-and the
Supreme Court-are not the main point.
In light of this, I think we ought to consider why we make the mistake
of focusing on the Supreme Court. I want to be very clear that I do not
believe that this blind spot is limited to these contexts, or that civil
procedure scholars are any more prone to it than anyone else in the legal
academy; I believe that there is a bias towards Supreme-Court-watching
throughout legal academia. But why do we privilege the Supreme Court?
Mostly, I think it is because watching the lower courts is incredibly
difficult 40 There are too many cases, too many judges, too many messy
issues, too many moving parts, and too many unpublished orders to be
able to identify' potential trends and issues as they emerge from the trial
courts, and often even from the appellate courts . It is only when a
particularly high-profile or stark case, a prominent split among
authorities, or an especially notable judicial opinion announces itself that
these trends become evident. No surprise or coincidence that these are
the cases in which the Supreme Court is likely to take interest.
To be sure, there are some scholars going to heroic efforts to
seriously study the trial courts, and we should all be attentive to those
efforts.4 But I do not believe that this will become the norm, even as our
empirical tools become better honed and the legal academy becomes
more comfortable with empirical methodologies.
In the end, then, I simply suggest that we subtly shift how we think
about the Supreme Court. Even as we avidly watch its docket, read its
opinions, organize symposia around its surprising moves, critique it, and
attempt to influence it, let us always keep in mind the Court is but one
actor in our vast bureaucratic system for disposing of disputes, and it is
just as likely-more likely, in fact-to be a lag indicator of what is going
on below than it is to be on the cutting edge.
'0 Levin, supra note 18, at 981-82.
I1d.
42 See, eg., David A. Hoffmnan et al., Dockeologo, District Couns, and Doctrine, 85
WASH. U. L. Rtv. 681 (2007).
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III. SUMMARYJUDGMENT'S LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE OF
PLEADING AND CIVIL PROCEDURE
Given that history appears to be repeating itself, I believe that our
experience with summary judgment and related changes over the past
two decades offers some lessons for the future of pleading and civil
procedure jurisprudence more broadly.
First, just as we have seen in the summary judgment context, we
should expect to see courts struggle to understand and apply the
plausibility standard for some time. Courts already began to do so in the
wake of Twombly, and though Iqbal resolved some of the questions
(chiefly by confirming that the plausibility standard applies to all cases),
many questions will remain (e.g., "what the heck does 'plausible'
mean?"). Over time, small but consequential fissures and circuit splits will
explicitly or implicitly arise, and once in a while, the Supreme Court will
wade back into the fray.
This, of course, is not just a lesson from the summary judgment
context, but from any area in which the Supreme Court articulates a new
rule, especially when the new rule is as vague as this one. What the
summary judgment context in particular suggests, however, is that the
differences among courts will not be limited to circuit splits or district
splits. Every appellate court panel and every district judge will have
its/his/her own intuitions about how to interpret and apply the
plausibility standard to specific cases. This is what we have seen in the
summary judgment context, where the judge must decide what a
"reasonable jury" could believe; and it is what we will likely see in the
pleadings context, where the judge must consider his or her own
experience in deciding whether a claim is plausible. And we should
expect judges to explicitly or implicitly disagree on just these kinds of
questions.
The second lesson from our experience with summary judgment is
that the plausibility standard may not necessarily introduce efficiencies
and cost-savings for defendants into the system. It is an open question in
the summary judgment context as to whether the process of litigating a
lawsuit on paper necessarily reduces overall costs, either for the court
system or even for defendants. It may delay settlement and increase
discovery costs and, if the motion is denied, the process may be effectively
duplicated if the case goes to ajury. 4
Similar possibilities present themselves with respect to the motion to
dismiss. In specific cases, of course, where "implausible" pleadings get
definitively tossed early, defendants will realize immediate savings, as they
will if cases that might have been brought under the old regime never get
brought in the first place. However, with respect to cases that survive
"See, e.g, John Bronsteen, Against Summaiy judgment, 75 CEo. WASH. L. REvT. 522
(2007); D. Theodore Rave, Note, Questioning the Efficiency of Summa~y judgment, 81
N.Y.U. L. R~v 875 (2006).
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motions to dismiss that would not have been made under the old regime,
the defendant is worse off under the new standards. That is, the new
standards may discourage early, cheap settlement and encourage more,
and more drawn-out, paper litigation, which obviously comes at a cost in
lawyers' fees. Perhaps even more importantly, we may see (and in fact are
beginning to see) more dismissals without prejudice, leading to an
expensive merry-go-round in which plaintiffs file pleadings, defendants
challenge them with motions to dismiss, dismissals are granted without
prejudice, plaintiffs refile, and so on." Finally, disputes that could have
been settled even before cases are filed may not be if defendants
anticipate that the case may be dismissed early under the new defense-
friendly standards. Ironically, then, as a result of Twombly and Iqbal, we
could see cases filed that would not have been filed under the old
standards. In the end, it will be difficult to tell whether, or at least how,
when, and how much, the plausibility standard saves defendants money.
Third, we should not expect the pleading context to be the final
impediment to access for plaintiffs to the courts. It is merely the latest.
This is not simply a lesson from our experience with summary judgment,
but from the much more general pattern that we have seen over the past
decades. The single counterexample that I can think of-that is, the only
recent instance of which I am aware in which the courts have moved
towards greater access of a kind-speaks volumes by its relative
insignificance. Here I speak of the fairly recent introduction of Rule 32.1
of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, which finally permitted
attorneys to cite to unpublished opinions . This was the culmination of
years of effort on the part of lawyers, judges, and scholars who were
justifiably appalled by ridiculous rules prohibiting lawyers from repeating
judges' own words to them.' Now, this does represent a triumph, of a
sort, in favor of access in the sense that it should incentivize judges to be
more careful with what they say and how they rule in unpublished
opinions, and that, no doubt, is a good thing. 7 But in the face of all of
the moves against access, this triumph seems rather beside the point.4
Thus, given the ratio of moves diminishing access to moves enhancing
access (I am no mathematician, so let us eschew precision and simply
ballpark the equation as a-whole-lot: a-teeny-tiny-bit), I believe it is safe to
predict that the trend will continue.
This, in turn, leads us to the next lesson. Where will future access-
diminishing changes come from? They could come from legislation, of
'4 Siegel, Iqbal Empirics, supra note 9.
45 FED. R. APP. P. 32.1 (2006). For a discussion on Rule 32.1, see Symposium,
supra note 18.
4See Patrick 1* Schiltz, Much Ado About Little: Explaining the Sturm Und Drang over
the Citation of Unpublished Opinions, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1429 (2005).
1SeeJoan M. Schaughnessy, Unpublication and the Judicial Concept of Audience, 62
WASH. &LEE L. REV. 1597 (2005).
48 See, e.g., William N. Richman, Much Ado About the Tip of the Iceberg, 62 WASH. &
LEE L. Rrv. 1723 (2005).
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course; they might come from rule changes; and they may be handed
down from the Supreme Court. But both the summary judgment context
and the pleading context suggest that we should keep our eyes on lower
court judges. They, as I have argued, have been the force behind access-
limiting changes in both contexts; and they, of course, are the ones most
affected by (and potentially most invested in) these kinds of changes.
Unfortunately, for a variety of reasons, it is much more difficult to
identify trends in their nascent stages on the trial and appellate courts;
but this is where the real action IS.
Finally, applying the watch-the-lower-courts lesson, and narrowing
the scope considerably, we should be waiy of drawing the conclusions
that some have that the Supreme Court does not understand trial court
practice, or that we would be better off if there were more justices with
trial court judicial experience. The question of limiting access or
expanding it is not one that pits wise and experienced lower courtjudges
against naive Supreme Court Justices. Rather, it is an ideological one. As
we have seen in both the summaryjudgment and the pleadings contexts,
the Supreme Court was pushed to its currentjurisprudence by lower courts.
There is little reason to believe, then, that the fact of having trial court
experience alone makes one more likely to prefer a notice standard in
pleading to a plausibility standard. And, if one requires further evidence
for this proposition, look no further than the author of the Twombly
opinion: justice David Souter, the single judge then on the court who
actually had trial court experience. 50
"Levin, supra note 18, at 979.
50 Bell Atd. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007).
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